Introduction
In the typical classroom, instruction has focused almost exclusively on the wellestablished products of science and cookbook approaches to laboratory exercises, using authoritarian teaching modes (Bell, 2006, p. 430) .
While youth need access to the intellectual riches of our societies, a nearly exclusive focus on societal achievements in the sciences can be highly problematic for them. Collins, Osborne, Ratcliffe, Millar and Duschl (2001) state, for example, that an "overemphasis on 'what we know' at the expense of 'how we know' results in a science education which too often leaves students only able to justify their beliefs by reference to the teacher as an authority" (p. 4). In other words, conditioned dependence on authorities may jeopardize students' potential autonomy in societal decision-making involving science and technology. As consumers of products and services generated using science and technology, for example, poor conceptions of the nature of knowledge generation and dissemination in these fields may limit the extent to which they can critically evaluate the merits of such products. This seems particularly crucial in societies where businessgenerated desires (e.g., via marketing) for products and services may be compromising the wellbeing of individuals, societies and environments (e.g., McMurtry, 1999) .
For these and other reasons he describes and defends, educators -and, ultimately, students -can greatly benefit from Derek Hodson's book, Towards Scientific Literacy: A Teachers' Guide to the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science (Sense, 2008) . In this article, I summarize and analyze this book in the light of relevant published works and my own experiences as a student and science educator.
About the Author
A major consideration in choosing any author's book would, of course, pertain to the person's credibility in the subject of the writing. Professor Derek Hodson has excellent credentials in this regard. His career has been and continues to be so extensive and complex that it is hard to know where to start. In his book, he notes that, "[a]s a schoolboy in the 1950s I always looked forward to the frequently dull science lessons being enlivened by the stories about scientists that sprinkled the pages of science textbooks by E.J. Holmyard and F. Sherwood Taylor" (p. ix). Later, in his undergraduate years in chemistry, he took a comprehensive philosophy of science course and attended lectures about the history and philosophy of science. "Later still, as a student teacher at the University of Exeter, [he said that he] was privileged to study with the eminent historian of science, H.J.J. Winter, author of Eastern Science: An Outline of its Scope and Contribution" (p. ix) .
Part of Professor Hodson's legitimacy for writing this book may stem from the fact that he has a Ph.D. in chemistry and has published several science articles from his workwith titles like, "-Diazosulphones and related compounds from the base-induced cleavage of -diazo--ketosulphones." As he notes in his book, scientists often do not have welldeveloped declarative conceptions of their work (as is the case with people in most occupations). However, deep work in a field, such as chemistry, is likely to, at the least, provide a person with extensive tacit knowledge about that field (Polanyi, 1958) . Tacit knowledge, in turn, can be linked to propositional knowledge -such as certain claims about science -and, thus, deepen the propositional knowledge. Judging from the extensive reference list in this book (789 references), Professor Hodson appears to have gained access to a considerable set of propositions about science. This may account for the richness of Professor Hodson's treatment of the complex subject matter in the history, philosophy and sociology of science (HPSS).
Immediately after obtaining his Ph.D. in chemistry, he began a career as a secondary science teacher -a field in which he worked until 1977, the year he accepted his first university faculty position (University of Wales). He has since worked as Lecturer or Professor in other universities in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Hong Kong. He is currently Adjunct Professor of Science Education at the University of Auckland, NZ.
Professor Hodson is an extremely prolific science education scholar, having published over 100 articles in refereed journals, 6 books (including this one) and 40 book chapters. His research and writing have spanned a great breadth of topic areas, including: computer assisted learning (educational technology), laboratory work, the history, philosophy, and sociology of science (nature of science), multicultural science education, antiracist education, gender issues in science education, science teacher education, the politicization (activist STSE Education) of science education and, most recently, scientists' conceptions of science and science education. Throughout this work, you will find that he has collaborated with colleagues, both locally and globally, and with graduate students and teachers. He also has published many sole-author articles and book chapters, sometimes being known as 'a great science education essayist.' Finally, Professor Hodson also excels as a graduate course instructor and thesis supervisor. He initiated and conducted several graduate courses at OISE, University of Toronto, including the one on which this book is based. His courses always attract large numbers of students, as evidenced by the numerous thesis students he has supervised; that is, 16 M.A., 13 M.Ed. 
Book Summary
Professor Hodson's book is a substantial piece of writing. In ten chapters, using 102,950 words (210 pages) of text, numerous footnotes in each chapter, and 789 references, he provides an extremely readable, comprehensive and argumentative coverage of history, philosophy and sociology of science relevant to school science. To give readers a flavour for the nature of this book, I have prepared a summary of each chapter -as shown in Table 1 . Readers may find this summary useful in reading my analyses, below. Barlex and Carre (1985) , "[w]e don't see things as they are, we see things as we are" (cited on p. 46). He makes this argument in many ways, using various examples. This enables him to take a stance on an important issue in science education; that being the tendency of educators to place students in positions that might suggest to them that science proceeds via induction -a view that he claims is mythical. In his view, students need to be explicitly taught theoretical conceptions enabling them to make sophisticated observations, rather than be expected to discover them. With this in mind, he points out that the distinction between observation and inference may not always be as clear as often is suggested in educational research and publication.
Chapter Four Chapters 3 and 4 establish cases for various historical tensions in both the nature of knowledge generation and dissemination processes and with regards to the truth value of knowledge claims of the sciences. Before elaborating on these issues (chapters 6 & 7), Professor Hodson first explores a central feature of science and science education; that is, empirical inquiry -much of which is conceived of in terms of experimentation. He begins by noting that "almost all textbooks and curriculum documents invest enormous faith in the capacity of observation and experiment to provide reliable data for making unequivocal decisions about the validity of theories" (p. 85). The balance of the chapter consists of his efforts to problematize this notion. He does so first by casting doubt on the validity and reliability of experimentation in the sciences, drawing on his claims relating to theory-data interactions from chapters 3 & 4. He says, for example, "in gathering data to test an hypothesis, the form of the hypothesis and the nature and method of data collection are dictated by the very theory that is under test. In other words, theory-independent experiments are impossible" (p. 86). He then uses his analyses of experimentation in the sciences to take issue with corresponding dominant practices in school science. He seriously challenges assumptions surrounding 'quasi-inductive' (more properly deductive) discovery-type inquiry activities (both guided and unguided) aimed at teaching pre-specified knowledge claims from the sciences. Associated with this concern are significant difficulties he has with the so-called 'process approaches' -in which students are taught, often in/as a sequence, individual science skills (e.g., control of variables) as a way of enabling them to conduct their own inquiries.
EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF SCIENCE
Of particular concern to him is the issue of transferability of skills among contexts -a issue that is understandable in the light of his emphasis on the theory-basis of almost everything in the sciences. Also problematized in this chapter are assumptions about a possible algorithmic 'scientific method' and the finality of individual experiments.
Chapter Six
REALISM OR INSTRUMENTALIS M

What Position for School Science?
Professor Hodson's analyses of knowledge building/dissemination methods in the last chapter provide an appropriate segue into the focus of this chapter; that is, on the truth value of scientists' knowledge claims. An important target of his analysis here is on the assumption "that there is a correct version of events and phenomena, and that the application of good scientific procedures and the adoption of appropriate attitudes will enable scientists to arrive at the truth about the world. Philosophers of science refer to this position as Chapter Eight
MAKING A CASE FOR HISTORY OF SCIENCE
Going Beyond Dates and Anecdotes
(12,372 words)
After his more philosophical and sociological analyses of the nature of the sciences, as depicted in the previous chapters, Professor Hodson then explores history of science (HoS) and its utility in school science. Noting that different stakeholders (e.g., historians vs. philosophers of science) might prefer different purposes, he provides detailed argumentation, with several specific examples for each, for eight possible uses of HoS; that is, for: i) for content development, ii) to humanize science for students, iii) for bridging the gap between students interested in the Arts and the Sciences, iv) for providing insights into the nature of science and science inquiry, v) for teaching about relationships amongst fields of science and technology and societies and environments (STSE), vi) for multicultural and antiracist education, vii) for promoting subject integration, and viii) for general scientific literacy. He stresses, however, that not every educator might choose all eight approaches -preferring those that best match their own curriculum emphases (e.g., a focus on content learning). This provides him with a segue into issues of representation of phenomena (human and inanimate) in history of science. He asks questions about who might benefit (e.g., scientists vs. citizens), depending on whether histories are told from an internalist (e.g., dealing with the logic of discovery/verification and social interactions amongst scientists) or an externalist (e.g., dealing with political, economic, socio-cultural factors as they affect science) perspective (Ziman, 1984) . Similarly, he queries the merits of emphasizing, in a Kuhnian sense, 'Normal' science (e.g., with its relative predictability) or 'Revolutionary' science (e.g., with its relative uncertainties, false starts and biases). Finally, he tackles issues of implementation of HoS in science education, not the least of which is school systems' tendency to over-emphasize teaching and learning of products of science and technology.
Chapter Nine
LOOKING FOR BALANCE IN THE CURRICULUM
Essential Elements in a Curriculum for Critical Scientific Literacy
(13,227 words)
As Professor Hodson states, "[t]he purpose of this chapter is to identify aspects of HPS [S] that are suitable for inclusion in the school science curriculum" (p. 175). Although, as he elaborates earlier in this book, historians, philosophers, sociologists, educators and others differ on the nature of science, he feels that it is important for educators to at least attempt to derive a consensus on an appropriate NoS education for students. Having said that, he is wary of emphasis on a series of broad claims about science -such as: 'scientists are creative' -that can be taught and assessed. Instead, he recommends that "teachers should be building an understanding of NOS from examples of the daily practice of diverse groups of scientists engaged in diverse practices, and should be creating opportunities for students to experience, explore and discuss the differences in knowledge and its generation across multiple contexts" (p. 180). In doing so, he recommends that teachers use explicit approaches (e.g., listing some NoS claims), in addition to implicit ones (e.g., having students draw their own conclusions about science from their own investigations). The balance of the chapter then consists of detailed arguments, with examples, of various possible claims; such as: "We should … 'tell the truth' about anomalous data. It is certainly not the case that scientists immediately abandon a theory when conflicting data arise. As Chinn and Brewer (1993, 1998) Cleminson, 1990, p. 437 ) is grossly misleading. Much of the scientific knowledge that students encounter in class is no longer tentative. Rather, it is well established, taken-forgranted and used in the production of further knowledge. It is categorically not the case that it could be invalidated by a simple experiment in a science class, and we do students a gross disservice by suggesting that it could" (p. 186). In this, the longest of his chapters, his arguments are deep, cogent and comprehensive.
Chapter Ten
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC
In this final chapter, Professor Hodson declares that " [t] he question at issue here and in the previous chapter is: what would constitute a sensible balance between the view that scientific knowledge is entirely independent of the social context in which it is generated and the position that says all knowledge (including science) is no more than a social construct?" (p. 199). Although he provides numerous examples of the views supporting the latter claim, he clearly aligns himself closer to the former position. He notes, for example, that
RATIONALITY
A View for School Science
(5,429 words) "…Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle was readily accepted by German physicists in the late 1920s because it enabled them to repudiate, to an extent, the charge that science was overly rationalistic, mechanical and deterministic and left no scope for human values. But arguing that the social context created the overall intellectual climate in which a particular idea was regarded as acceptable is not to establish social conditions as the primary cause of its acceptance. The Uncertainty Principle was accepted primarily because it was an exceptionally good idea, because it solved a number of long-standing problems, and because it enabled the discipline of physics to make progress" (p. 201). At the same time, near the chapter's end, he acknowledges pressures on scientists from business/industry and the government/military: "contemporary science is highly dependent on research funding, and regardless of whether funds are provided by industry, the military, universities or government, there is increasing pressure for research to be directed towards the solving of practical problems, creating commercial opportunities, establishing military advantage and meeting public interest needs" (pp. 207-208) . He goes on to say, "Pressures on scientists can be such that they engage in misconduct and even fraud" (p. 209). In the end, he suggests, "[t]eachers have important decisions to make about the extent to which they will raise these kinds of issues in the curriculum" (p. 209).
[Note to Editor and Publisher: Please fit this table to the journal as you see fit. This may involve changes in font and/or font size.]
Book Characteristics
In reviewing Professor Hodson's book, using constant comparative methods based on constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000) , it became apparent to me that it can be understood in terms of a few general themes. Each of these is discussed, with examples from the book, below.
Constructivism-informed
It is clear to me that Professor Hodson supports constructivist perspectives on knowledge development and learning. In chapter three, in which he first analyzes views about science, for example, he quotes from Kant (1929, p. 22) : " 'Our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of knowledge supplies …' " (p. 42). This leads him into a critical analysis of human conceptions of observing, induction and science progress. In the end, it is clear to me that he believes that all aspects of science -including observing, hypothesizing, experiment design/analysis, report writing, etc. -are theory-dependent. This view permeates the book. For example, in his chapter on use of historical case studies, he notes that history is always continually re-evaluated in the light of new theoretical perspectives (p. 165).
-
His epistemological perspectives remind me of a constructivist version of knowledge duality theory; that is, that human representations of reality (e.g., knowledge claims) are in dialectical, but uncertain, relationship with phenomena of the world. This is nicely illustrated in Figure 1 , a schematic taken from Roth's (2001) discussion of sciencetechnology relationships. He stresses that scientists' 'Signs' (representations, such as drawings, algorithms, etc.) may not accurately represent the 'World' (of phenomena), due to the idea of ontological gaps; that is, inconsistencies in the process of translations between ontological entities (e.g., from light, to human sense reaction, to drawing of light rays).
As a consequence of his constructivist epistemological perspectives, he recommends various constructivism-informed practices. For example, with regards to the tendency of school science systems -involving government, textbook publishers, business leaders, etc. -to prioritize quasi-inductive discovery-type inquiry activities, he counters that: "it is the science teacher's job to ensure that students perceive the world in the appropriate way -that is, the way in which currently accepted science (or the school version of it) deems appropriate" (p. 53). Similarly, when recommending explicit attention to particular claims about science, he critiques implicit strategies: "Implicit approaches, in which students are expected to acquire understanding by 'reading between the lines' as they engage in classroom activities, particularly practical work, have been shown to be, at best, only moderately successful in achieving their goals" (pp. 208-209) .
Congruent with his lengthy, deep and productive academic career, Professor Hodson's book addresses, in a richly-illustrated way, a breadth of views about professional science. One way of comprehending this breadth is through reference to Loving's (1991) Scientific Theory Profile (STP), illustrated in Figure 2 . In this profile, one can imagine teachers, philosophers, etc. holding various positions with reference to the two axes.
This book addresses a broad spectrum of views throughout the STP, with a much greater emphasis on the history and philosophy of science in the first half of the book and, afterwards, a significantly increased focus on the sociology of science. Although he does move back and forth, there also is a general transition from views more aligned with Rationalist-Realist positions on the STP through to more Naturalist-Antirealist positions. He begins, indirectly in his analyses of observation and induction, with reference to empiricist science -such as that of Greek scientists, including Aristotle, Thales, Eratosthenes and Ptolemy. This is followed by a discussion of the more Rationalist positions of Popper and Lakatos, which he then begins to challenge through discussions of the work of Kuhn and Feyerabend. As part of this transition, he moves from an emphasis on the internal through to the external sociology of science. For example, a more Rationalist perspective dealing with the internal sociology of science is: "… scientific knowledge has to survive rigorous critical scrutiny by members of the scientific community, who achieve consensus by employing well-characterized methods and clearly stated criteria of judgement" (p. 101). On the other hand, he deeply discusses Naturalist perspectives dealing with the external sociology of science:
Given the relationship between knowledge production and commercial, political and military power, "truth is what the powerful say it is" and those in positions of power and influence determine reality for the rest of us. It is these relationships between power and knowledge and between power and scientific practice that we should address through the politicization of the science curriculum (Hodson, 1994 (Hodson, , 2003 .
Argumentative
Instead of simply summarizing the range of perspectives throughout Loving's (1991) STP, Professor Hodson arranges these discussions in a way that can create cognitive dissonance in the reader. For example, as you read his account of Karl Popper's views about science, you might be convinced of the merits of falsifying hypotheses in the light of disconfirming evidence. For example, he says: "the proposition 'planets move around the Sun in elliptical orbits' is more at risk of falsification than 'planets orbit the Sun' " (p. 69). But, then, he casts doubt on claims he has just made -with statements like, It is precisely because theories are complex structures, supported by a complex array of other theories (for example, theories of perception and theories underpinning scientific instrumentation), that an apparently falsifying observation can be deflected away from what Imre Lakatos calls the hard core of the theory (p. 72).
Arranging discussions in a way that first perhaps leads people to accept a commonly-held position (as is the case with Popper's falsificationist views), but then creates cognitive dissonance through introduction of an alternative view (e.g., Lakatos' research programmes) appears to be a pedagogical strategy based on constructivist learning principles (e.g., Osborne & Wittrock, 1985) . Learners, for example, can become more fully conscious of their pre-instructional positions (e.g., Popper) before having to confront a well-explained alternative view (e.g., Lakatos). The cognitive dissonance that is created with this confrontation can motivate conceptual change. Indeed, I remember, as a student in Professor Hodson's graduate courses, feeling 'shocked' when I suddenly had to re-think my positions on such practices as use of guided quasi-inductive inquiries in my teaching.
Presenting alternative perspectives for most claims also appears to fit with principles of argumentation. According to Toulmin (1958) , for example, scholarly arguments should contain such elements as warrants (theory) in support of claims, which also are connected to data/examples; but, as well, they should have rebuttals (counter-claims) and, related to that, claims should make appropriate use (depending on the strength of the rebuttal(s), of qualifying statements and/or adjectives and adverbs. A good example of his attention to counter-arguments can be seen in this quote:
Mitroff and Mason (1974) concluded that scientists are arranged along a continuum from extreme speculative scientists, who "wouldn't hesitate to build a whole theory of the solar system based on no data at all" (p. 1508), to data bound scientists, who "wouldn't be able to save their own hide if a fire was burning next to them because they'd never have enough data to prove the fire was really there (p. 1508)" (p. 133).
Forthright
Although this book has many series of arguments and counter-arguments, Professor Hodson does not, necessarily, leave readers to guess his position. He is, indeed, quite forthright regarding his views about science, science education research and school science. Part of this is due to the clarity of his writing. He is, in my view, a wonderful writer. Reading his work is like speaking with him, and students have been enamoured with this for years. There is evidence of this personal style in his use of humour, with this quote being one of my favourites: "[Quoting one of his students,] 'How can you tell if a scientist is an extrovert? [Answer] He looks at your shoes when he is talking to you' " (emphasis added, p. 29). The ease of reading of his work also is enhanced through his use of metaphors, signposts (notes about the book's structure) and a kind-of 'spiral curriculum' (repeating points in different ways/contexts).
Congruent with his preference for deduction over induction in education, Professor Hodson is quick to declare his positions and then provide argumentative support for them. On page 2 of the book, for example, he declares:
My use of the term "universal critical scientific literacy" signals my rejection of the longstanding differentiation of science education into high status, academic/theoretical courses for those deemed (on the basis of attainment tests) to be 'high ability students' and low status courses oriented towards 'life skills' for the rest.
Similarly, in wrestling with the tension he sets up between Realists and Instrumentalists (refer, especially, to chapter 6), he declares his intermediate position: "[T]he view I wish to promote for school science is that scientists play both a realist game and an instrumentalist game, as determined by their immediate purpose: … which some have termed critical realism" (p. 115).
In taking his particular positions, it is important to note that Professor Hodson's views often are contentious, challenging taken-for-granted assumptions about science, science education research and school science. 
